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The Rise and Fall of Provisional
Validity-The Need. for a Rule of
Reason in EEC Antitrust*
Valentine Korah **
The doctrine ofprovisional validity invented by the Community Court
now applies to very few agreements. Mrs. Korah believes that unless a rule
of reason is applied to restraints ancillary to agreements that lead to new
competitive pressures, the risk of collaboration may become excessive. Mrs.
Korah also expresses concern that this may reduce the dynamism of Com-
munity industry in competition with American and Japanesefirms.
INTRODUCTION
Article 85(1) of the EEC Treaty' prohibits as incompatible with
* In Korah, Comfort Letters-Rfections on the Perfume Cases, 6 EUR. L. REV. 14 (1981), the
author contributed a longer article in which she considered whether the "comfort letters" in the
Perfume cases were correct in stating that the selective distribution agreements did not infringe
art. 85 (1); whether those agreements were a valid justification for refusing to supply other retailers
under French law; the Court's ruling that the issue of such letters deprived the agreements of their
provisional validity and the possibilities of appealing against them. Mrs. Korah also considered,
although in less detail than in this article, the risks for entrepreneurs who would not have invested
in collaboration unless they expected to be able to enforce ancillary restraints. For a discussion of
the Perfume cases, see text accompanying notes 55-63 infra.
LL.M., Ph.D., Reader in English Law at University College London, Barrister.
I Article 85 provides:
1. The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market: all agree-
ments between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted prac-
tices which may affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect
the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the common market, and in
particular those which:
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading conditions;
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or investment;
(c) share markets or sources of supply;
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties,
thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of sup-
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the Common Market agreements between undertakings which affect
trade between Member States and have as their object or effect the re-
striction, prevention or distortion of competition within the Common
Market. Article 85(3) provides for exemptions, while Article 85(2) ren-
ders void agreements that infringe the Article as a whole. Until the
enactment of the first implementing Regulation, No. 17/62,2 the Com-
mission did not enforce these rules very effectively, although under Ar-
ticle 88 of the Treaty the German competition authority, the
Bundeskartellamt, did apply the Community rules in a few cases. Arti-
cle 9(3) of the Regulation provided that national authorities might ap-
ply the prohibition of Article 85(1) and it was held much later in
Belgian Radio and Television v. SABAMI that the direct effect of Com-
munity law in national legal systems requires national civil and com-
mercial courts to refuse to give effect to contractual provisions that
infringe the competition rules. Article 9(1) of the Regulation, however,
conferred on the Commission of the European Communities ("the
Commission")4 exclusive power to exempt agreements from the prohi-
bition by virtue of Article 85(3). The Regulation included no transi-
tional provisions relating to agreements that had been negotiated
before the Treaty took effect and before the extent of the competition
plementary obligations which, by their nature of according to commercial usage, have no
connection with the subject of such contracts.
2. Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this Article shall be automatically
void.
3. The provisions of paragraph I may, however, be declared inapplicable in the case of:
any agreement or category of agreements between undertakings;
any decision or category of decisions by associations of undertakings;
any concerted practice or category of concerted practices; which contributes to improving the
production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic progress, while
allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit, and which does not:
(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indispensable to
the attainment of these objectives;
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a
substantial part of the products in question.
Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. I I (entered
in force Jan. 1, 1958) [hereinafter cited as EEC Treaty].
2 Regulation 17/62, O.J. EuR. Comm. 87 (Spec. Ed. 1959-62).
3 [1974] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 313, [1974] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 238. In SAB4M, the Court
ruled that national authorities in Article 9(3) referred to national competition authorities such as
the Bundeskartellanit, rather than to civil and commercial courts, which must give effect to the
nullity resulting from Article 85(2) because of its direct effect on national law.
4 The functions of the Commission under the Competition rules are exercised by its Competi-
tion Department, Directorate General IV (hereinafter referred to as D.G. IV). This employs
fewer than 300 officials, including secretaries and inspectors and they deal not only with the provi-
sions controlling firms, but also with the control of public undertakings and state aids. It has
always been kept short of staff. For example, more officials are employed in the various competi-
tion authoritie of the U.K. or in Germany than in D.G. IV.
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rules had been worked out in practice. It is these agreements that are
the subject of the first part of this article.
Until the first decisions under Article 85, made by the Commission
in 1964, the uncertainty about the scope of the Article was almost com-
plete. It was even argued that vertical agreements were not affected by
it. It was impossible for businessmen to obtain firm advice as to what
agreements were prohibited, or how much of the agreement was void.
In the 1960s, the Court of Justice of the European Communities, which
I shall call "the Court" or "the Community Court," made several im-
portant judgments in which it minimized the effects of this uncertainty.
In La Technique Minibre v. Maschinenbau Um,' for example, the Com-
munity Court ruled that where an agreement falls within the prohibi-
tion of Article 85(1), and is incapable of exemption, it is not the whole
agreement that is void, but only those provisions of the agreement that
offend the Article.6
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE OF PROVISIONAL VALIDITY
Even earlier, in Bosch,7 the Court developed a doctrine of provi-
sional validity. Articles 4 and 5 of Regulation 17 provide a system of
notification for agreements in respect of which an exemption under Ar-
ticle 85(3) is desired, although notification is not required for the ex-
emption of agreements of the kinds listed in Article 4(2).8 Exemptions
may be granted under Article 6, provided that the agreement has been
duly notified or is dispensed from notification. Where an agreement
was made before the Regulation came into force and was notified in
due time, Article 7 provides that the validation may be fully retroac-
tive, and may be granted even when, as originally made, the agreement
did not merit exemption, provided that it is later modified so as to merit
exemption or escape the prohibition of Article 85(1). Such an exemp-
tion does not prevail against a party who has not consented to its
notification.
5 [1966] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 235, 250, [1966] Comm. Mkt. L.R. 357.
6 The automatic nullity in question only applies to those parts of the agreement affected by
the prohibition or to the agreement as a whole if it appears that those parts are not severable from
the agreement itself. Consequently, any otier contractual provisions which are not affected by the
prohibition, and which therefore do not involve the application of the Treaty, fall outside Com-
munity law. Id. at 250, [1966] Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 376.
7 DeGeus v. Bosch and van Rijn, [1962] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 45, [1962] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R.
1.
8 Further kinds of agreements were added to the list of those dispensed from notification in
Article 4(2) by Reg. 2822/71, 14 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L 285) 42 (1971). Article 4 requires
notification of new agreements-those made after March 12, 1962-while Article 5, which is in
virtually identical language, requires notification of old agreements if they are to be exempt.
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In its judgment in Bosch, the Community Court inferred that the
Regulation envisaged that in 1962 there would be agreements caught
by the prohibition of Article 85(1) in respect of which no decision of
exemption had been taken, but which were not void. From the general
principles of law common to Member States, the Court stated that ju-
ridical certainty must be maintained, and held that an agreement in
existence at the effective date of Regulation 17, which was capable of
retroactive validation and which had not been the subject of any bind-
ing declaration, could not be void meanwhile. As a result
[a]greements and decisions in existence at the date of entry into force of
this Regulation are not annulled automatically by the mere fact that they
fall within the ambit of Article 85(1). Such agreements and decisions
must be considered valid insofar as they fall within Article 5(2) of the
Regulation [which dispenses certain classes of agreements from notifica-
tion]; they must be considered as provisionally valid when, although not
excepted by operation of that provision, they are notified in time to the
Commission in accordance with Article 5(1) of the said Regulation.
This validity is not definitive since Article 85(2) operates to make
agreements automatically void when the authorities of Member States ex-
ercise the powers conferred on them by Article 88 of the Treaty, and
maintained under Article 9 of the Regulation, to apply Article 85(1), and
to declare certain agreements and decisions to be prohibited.9
The Court then referred to Article 7 of Regulation 17, which enables
the Commission to exempt an agreement retroactively. From this too,
the Court inferred agreements were not "automatically void as long as
the Commission has not reached a decision with regard to them, or
unless the authorities of Member States have decided that Article 85 is
applicable."' 0
The Court's ruling was confined to agreements made before the
9 [1962] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 52-53, [1962] Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 28-29. The Court went on
to say that the opposite interpretation would lead to the inadmissible result that some agreements
would already have been automatically void for several years without having been so declared by
any authority, and even though they might ultimately be validated subsequently with retroactive
effect. In general, it would be contrary to the general principle of legal certainty-a rule of of law
to be upheld in the application of the Treaty--to render agreements automatically void before it is
even possible to tell which are the agreements to which Article 85 as a whole applies.
Moreover, in accordance with the text of Article 85(2), which in referring to agreements or
decisions "prohibited pursuant to this Article" seems to regard Article 85(1) and (3) as forming an
indivisible whole, this Court is bound to admit that up to the time of entry into force of the First
Regulation Implementing Articles 85 and 86, the nullifying provisions had operated only in re-
spect of agreements and decisions which the authorities of the Member States, on the basis of
Article 88, have expressly held to fall under Article 85(1), and not to qualify for exemption under
85(3), nor in respect of which the Commission has taken the decision envisaged by Article 89.
I have used the term "validation" as it is not clear whether Article 7 provides for exemption
or negative clearance. For a discussion of Article 7, see note 20 infra.
10 Id. at 53, [1962] Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 29.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 3:320(1981)
Regulation came into force. It added that agreements which were not
dispensed from notification and had not been notified within the time
limits, should become automatically void from the time the Regulation
came into force. It added that agreements which were not dispensed
from notification and had not been notified within the time limits,
should become automatically void from the time the Regulation came
into force." This was a strong judgment, difficult to reconcile with Ar-
ticle 85(2) of the Treaty or with the inclusion of Article 7 in the Regula-
tion, which seems unnecessary to the Court's ruling. It was largely
based on the policy ground that contracts should be enforceable. In
Bosch, the Court did not explain the extent of the temporary validity it
had created. The national courts, left on their own to arrive at an un-
derstanding of the doctrine, treated such agreements in different ways:
German and Dutch courts treated agreements as fully valid until the
Commission had decided whether to exempt them; Belgian courts more
cautiously refused to enforce such agreements because of the precari-
ousness of the provisional validity if the parties were not willing to
comply with them voluntarily; l2 and in France the courts came to a
similar conclusion for reasons since invalidated by the Community
Court.
In three later judgments, the Community Court extended the con-
cept of the provisional validity. In Portelange,'3 the Court ruled that
"[a]greements referred to in Article 85(1) of the Treaty, which have
been duly notified under Regulation No. 17/62, arefuly valid so long
as the Commission has made no decision under Article 85(3) and the
provisions of the said Regulation."' 4 In Bilger v. Jehle,'5 the Court
used similar language in ruling that an "agreement which is exempt
from notification and which has not been notified isfully effective for so
long as it has not been found to be void."' 6 Finally, inPa~fumsRochas
II Id. at 55, [1962] Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 31.
12 See Waelbroeck, Que reste-t-il de la validit provisoire des ententes?, (1974) CArIERS DE
DROIT EUROPEEN [C.D.E.] 169; and Gijlstra & Murphy, EEC Competition Law after the Brasserie
de Haecht II and SAtB4M Cases, 2 LEGAL ISSUES OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION [LIEI] 77, 94
(1974).
13 Portelange v. Smith Corona Marchant Int'l., [1969] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 309, 317, [1974] 1
Comm. Mkt. L.R. 397, 419.
14 Id. at 316, [1974] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 397 (emphasis added).
15 [1970] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 127, [1974] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 382.
16 Id. at 137, [1974] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 393 (emphasis added). The Court drafts its judg-
ments in French, and in both cases it used the wordsplein efet. This was confirmed by the Court
in De Bloos. For a discussion of De Bloos, see text accompanying note 40 infra.
Although a national court was not to be able to declare an old agreement dispensed from
notification to be void for the past, it was open until De Bloos whether a national court might
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v. Bitsch,17 the Court ruled that "[a]greements referred to in Article
85(1) of the Treaty and concluded after entry into force of Regulation
No. 17/62, which are an exact reproduction of a standard contract pre-
viously concluded and duly notified as such, are entitled to benefit from
the same system of provisional validity as the latter."18 This ruling was
particularly strong; it resulted in the enforcement of an export ban,
which is considered a most objectionable restriction under Community
competition laws.19
THE MERITS OF THE DOCTRINE OF PROVISIONAL VALIDITY
These cases on provisional validity have been criticized on more
than one ground. Bilger v. Jehle involved an agreement dispensed
from notification and which had not been notified. One might have
thought, therefore, that Article 7 of the Regulation,20 on which reliance
had been placed in the other cases, could not apply, although if the
agreement merited exemption as it stood, exemption under Article 6
might be retroactive. No such qualifications were made by the Court,
which stated:
[a] different solution would seriously endanger legal certainty to the detri-
ment of parties who, having concluded an agreement which is exempt
from notification on the ground that it is unlikely to affect trade between
Member States, could reasonably expect this agreement to have, in this
respect, at least the same effect as notified agreements dating from before
13 March 1962.21
In other cases,22 the Court has referred to the fifth recital to the Regula-
tion2 to show that agreements dispensed from notification are those
declare such a contract to be void in the future by virtue of Article 85(2). Then the validity was
held to be absolute until judgment was given in Lancbme. See text accompanying note 57 infra.
17 [1970] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 515, [1971] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 104.
18 Id. at 525, [1971] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 118.
19 See text accompanying notes 81-85 infra.
20 As amended, Article 7 provides:
1. Where agreements... in existence at the date into force of this Reg. and not/fled
within the time limits specified in article 5(1) do not satisfy the requirements of article 85(3)
of the Treaty and the undertakings ... concerned cease to give effect to them or modify them
in such manner that they no longer fall within the prohibition contained in article 85(1) or
that they satisfy the requirements of article 85 (3), the prohibition contained in article 85(1)
shall apply only for a period fixed by the Commission....
Regulation 17/62, supra note 2, at art. 7 (emphasis added).
21 Bilger v. Jehle, [1970] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 127, 136, [1974] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 382, 392.
22 See, eg., Roubaix v. Roux, [1976] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 111, [1976] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R.
538.
23 Reg. 17/62, note 2 supra, provides in the fifth recital, that: "[wlhereas, on the one hand,
such agreements, decisions and concerted practices are probably very numerous and cannot there-
fore all be examined at the same time and, on the other hand, some of them have special features
which may make them less prejudicial to the development of the common market......
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thought less prejudicial to the Common Market. For these agreements,
the public policy requiring nullity is not very strong.
Officials employed by Directorate General IV (D.G.IV), the Com-
petition Department of the Commission, became concerned about pro-
visional validity on policy grounds. D.G.IV had been allocated
insufficient staff to produce decisions about more than a small minority
of the agreements notified, and it hoped that the "automatic" remedy
of nullity would supplement its meager enforcement resources. In the
writer's view, however, the sanction of nullity is an unfortunate one. In
relation to the kind of restrictions that are condemnedper se under the
Sherman Act, it is not very effective: horizontal price fixing or market
sharing and collective boycotts may be implemented without recourse
to the courts. In relation to the kinds of agreement subject to the rule
of reason in the United States, it is not easy to tell whether an agree-
ment restricts competition perceptibly or is intended to do so. The
Community Court has ruled that agreements must be considered in
their economic context and that a market analysis should be made.'4
Not only do national courts have difficulty in making such economic
assessments, the cost of furnishing the appropriate evidence in order to
enforce a small contract may be out of all proportion to the value of the
sanction. To require civil and commercial courts to make such deci-
sions imposes a heavy burden on both court and litigant.25 It will be
suggested later that the possible invalidity of ancillary restraints may
add to the risks of collaboration in innovation and discourage firms
from investing in collaboration from which their partners and competi-
tors may reap much of the benefit.
The doctrine of provisional validity was clearly derived from pol-
icy considerations: that parties who could not obtain advice as to
whether their agreements would infringe Article 85 should be able to
enforce them.
On the other hand, the Treaty clearly laid down that agreements
that infringe Article 85 shall be void. As Professor Waelbroeck has
argued, it is difficult to reconcile the doctrine of provisional validity
with the structure of the Treaty and of Regulation 17.26
24 See, e.g., Brasserie de Haecht v. Wilkin (No. 1), [1967] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 407, [1968]
Comm. Mkt. L.R. 26; Metro v. Commission, [1977] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1875, 1904-5, [1978] 2
Comm. Mkt. L.R. 1.
25 Korah, Comfort Leters-Relections on the Perfume Cases, 6 EUR. L.R. 14, 16 (1981).
26 See note 12 supra. It is doubtful whether the Council of Ministers had power to enact
Article 7, which appears to conflict with Article 85(2) of the Treaty. In Bosch, however, Advocate
General Legrange came close to saying that Article 85 should be construed in light of the regula-
tion implementing it. DeGeus v. Bosch and Rijn, [1962] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 63, [1962]
Provisional Validity and the Rule of Reason
3:320(1981)
JUDICIAL LIMITATION OF PROVISIONAL VALIDITY
The concern of officials and practitioners about the compatibility
of the doctrine of provisional validity with Article 85(2) of the Treaty,
and about the failure of the Commission to condemn many agreements
that restricted competition in the Common Market seems to have been
communicated to the judges in Luxembourg.' In Brasserie de Haecht
v. Wilkin (No. 2), the Court was asked to rule, inter alia whether
[t]he nullity of contracts exempted from notification [should] be deemed
to take effect from the date when one of the contracting parties duly
brings an action for it or merely from the date of the judgment or the
decision of the Commission which establishes it. 8
The agreement under which a small caf6 had agreed to take its total
requirements of beer and soft drinks from the seller, de Haecht, was in
the terms of a standard contract first used before Regulation 17 came
into force, but notified late. The Court held that because the agreement
had not been notified in time, it should be treated as a new agreement,
and the Court distinguished its four earlier decisions on the ground that
they related to "old" agreements; that is, agreements notified on time
and made before the Regulation came into force. This ruling seems to
represent a change of heart by the Court. It is not easily reconciled
with Bilger v. Jehe;29 both agreements were dispensed from notifica-
tion and both were made on a standard form originally used before the
Comm. Mkt. L. R. at 14. The Court stated that "[this provision of Article 7 of the Regulation can
be understood only on the basis that agreements and decisions shall not be automatically void as
long as the Commission has not reached a decision in regard to them, or unless the authorities in
Member States have decided that Article 85 is applicable." Id. at 53, [1962] Comm. Mkt. L.R. at
29. Samkalden, Het arrest van her Hof van Justitie deEuropese Gemeenschappen van 64pri11962 in
Zaak 13/61 (Bosch), SEW 225 (1962), also pointed out that the Bosch judgment is inconsistent
with Article 1 of Reg. 17, which provides that infringement of the competition rules are prohibited
"no prior decision to that effect being required."
27 M. Waelbroeck, 4 LE DRorr DE LA COMMUNAUTE ECONOMIQUE EUROPEAN, concurrence
at 161-78 (Megret ed. 1972), analysed and criticised the case law lucidly and cogently.
28 [1973] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 77, [1973] Comm. Mkt. L.R. 287. See also comments by
Waelbroeck and by Gijlstra and Murphy, note 12 supra.
29 The Bilger agreement was actually made in 1955, long before the Regulation, while that in
de Haecht was made shortly afterwards. In Rochas, however, it was held that if a standard form
of contract had been used before the Regulation and duly notified in time, agreements later made
on identical terms were to be treated as old agreements. Parfums Rochas v. Bitsch, [1970] E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 525, [1971] Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 118. The agreement in deHaecht was one
dispensed from notification, and as the Bilger ruling treated agreements dispensed from notifica-
tion like duly notified ones, it was thought that an agreement made after the Regulation on an old
form that was dispensed from notification would be treated as an old one. In this Bilger was
confirmed in Beguelin v. S.C.L Import Export, [1971] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep 949, [1972] Comm.
Mkt. L.R. 81. It is also difficult to reconcile de Haecht 2 with De Bloos v. Bouyer, [1977] E.
Comm. CL J. Rep. 2359, [1978] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 511.
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Regulation came into force. That de Haecht had eventually notified its
standard form late should not make it harder to enforce the agreement.
Contrary to its usual practice, the Court did not confine its reason-
ing to the three questions asked by the Liege tribunal de commerce. In
de Haecht (2), the Court began with an introduction dealing generally
with provisional validity. After observing that there were no transi-
tional provisions in Regulation 17, and that the national court was re-
quired to treat agreements as void without enjoying the flexible powers
to grant retroactive exemptions conferred on the Commission, the
Court confirmed that
[i]n the case of old agreements, the general principles of contractual cer-
tainty, particularly when the agreement has been notified in accordance
with the provisions of Regulation No. 17, requires that the court [i.e., a
national court asked to enforce a contract] may only declare it to be auto-
matically void after the Commission has taken a decision by virtue of that
Regulation.
30
The Court continued, however, to distinguish agreements made after
the Regulation came into force. Such agreements are invalid even
before being condemned by the Commission: they can be implemented
only at the parties' risk, and notification has no validating effect. The
long delays by the Commission and the principle of legal certainty can-
not prevail against the interest of the party alleging that the contract is
void:
In such a case it devolves on the court [i.e., the national commercial court]
to judge, subject to the possible application of Article 177, whether there
is cause to suspend proceedings in order to allow the parties to obtain the
Commission's standpoint, unless it establishes either that the agreement
does not have any perceptible effect on competition or trade between
Member States or that there is no doubt that the agreement is incompati-
ble with Article 85. 3'
This ruling was expressly extended to agreements exempted from noti-
fication on the ground that they "are generally less harmful to the
smooth functioning of the common market."3
Three steps are open to a national court or arbitrator. If the court
or arbitrator decides that an agreement does not come within the prohi-
bition of Article 85(1), it may enforce the agreement in accordance with
its own law.3 Secondly, if it is clear that the agreement cannot be en-
forced, for instance because it had not been notified before the period
30 [1973] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 86-87, [1973] Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 301-302, para. 9.
31 Id. at 87, [1973] Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 302, para. 12.
32 Id., [1973] Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 303.
33 Similarly, it could enforce the agreement if satisfied that it came within the group exemp-
tion granted by Reg. 67/67. See note 35 infra.
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in issue in national litigation, the court may refuse to enforce the re-
strictive provisions. Thirdly, it may adjourn, to enable the Commission
to decide whether to grant an exemption.
The first two courses of action may result in conflict with the Com-
mission, should it eventually come to a contrary decision. The Com-
munity Court did not advert to this possibility or require national
courts to reserve liberty for the parties to apply, should the Commission
come to a contrary view. The agreement is to be treated as void only if
it is clear that it infringes Article 85, but that is a matter on which views
may well differ. The Court also did not consider to what extent a na-
tional court may grant interlocutory relief if it adjourns the case to en-
able the Commission to make a decision. Would it be right to issue an
injunction to enforce a possible restriction on competition or to require
the payment of royalties, given in return for exclusivity, the compatibil-
ity of which with Article 85 is in dispute?
Another issue which remains undecided is whether "accession
agreements," those made before the accession of new Member States
and which began to infringe Article 85 only on accession, should be
treated as "old" agreements if notified within the six months allowed
by the Treaties of Accession.34 It may be argued that the considera-
tions of contractual certainty are less strong in relation to new agree-
ments than old. By 1973, when the first accessions were made, there
was far more certainty about the kinds of agreement covered by the
prohibition of Article 85(1), and group exemptions had already been
granted to certain kinds of distribution and specialization agreements.
Although there are many agreements that can now be drawn so as
to come within a group exemption, or escape the prohibition of Article
85(1), considerable difficulties remain. Some new agreements were
made when the law was quite unclear-before 1964-when the first de-
cisions were published by the Commission. Even where it is clear
whether an exemption will be given (and it seldom is since the Com-
34 The U.K. government submitted that such agreements should be treated as "old" ones.
L'Oreal v. DeNievwe, [1980] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3775, [1981] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 235. Signor
Marchini-Camia observes, however, that by the time of the first accession in 1973, the law was far
more developed than in 1962, and the uncertainty considerably less for many kinds of agreements.
Marchini-Camia, note 40 infra. Nevertheless, on a literal reading of Reg. 17, as adapted by the
Treaties of Accession, which added a new Article 25, such agreements are old ones. One might
add that before accession, such agreements were valid, and provided that they are notified within
six months of accession, the Commission should be able to deal with those that are
anticompetitive.
35 Reg. 67/67, 10 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. 57) 849 (1967) and Reg. 2779/72, 15 O.J. EUR.
COMM. (No. L 292) 23 (1972), amended by Reg. 2903/77, 20 O.J. Eut. COMM. (No. L 338) 14
(1977).
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mission is required to consider all the circumstances surrounding an
individual agreement) only the Commission has power to grant it, and
the Commission may well impose conditions or require the agreement
to be modified first. Where collaboration involves expenditure or the
commitment of assets, uncertainty as to the enforceability of ancillary
restraints may discourage it. Certainty is needed when contracts are
being negotiated, not only when they are being enforced.
Some of the problems that arise in relation to new agreements
were raised in De Notre v. Concordia,36 but did not have to be solved
by the Court. Concordia observed that a single requirements contract
with a small customer may well not have the effects prohibited by Arti-
cle 85, unless many other dealers are tied to the same or other suppliers.
It is the cumulative effect of many such contracts that may restrict com-
petition. When that point is reached, not an easy point to isolate, is it
only later agreements that are void, or do those already made become
void? Foreclosure may be increased if the minimum size of plant or
distribution system at which most of the economies of scale can be
achieved increases, because a new entrant would need to supply a
larger part of the market to be viable.17 Would such an increase in
optimal size also have the effect of avoiding existing contracts? The
particular problems raised in the brewery cases have been overcome
since, as a result of Roubaix v. Roux and Concordia, it has become clear
that they do fall within the group exemption of Regulation 67/67.
Such problems remain, however, where that Regulation does not
clearly apply and the Commission has been interpreting it very
narrowly.
38
In Concordia, the Commission submitted that in deciding whether
an agreement is void, a national court should emphasize legal certainty,
and attempt to minimize the risk of a decision contrary to what the
Commission might later decide. A national court should take into ac-
count the practice of the Commission, to be found not only in its pub-
lished decisions, but also from other sources, such as its submissions to
36 [1977] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 65, [1977] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 378.
37 It is submitted that a requirements contract forecloses competitors of the supplier only when
so much of the market is tied by similar agreements, or affected by loyalty and other discounts,
that a new firm enjoying most of the economies of scale in production and distribution cannot find
enough outlets in the free market. The foreclosing effects depend not only on the size of the free
market, but also on the minimum efficient size at which a new firm can enter, and on the possibili-
ties of expansion for existing firms. This was largely spelled out, though in less abstract terms, by
Advocate General Roemer indeHaecht (No 1), [1967] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 423, [1968] Comm.
Mkt. L.R. at 39.
38 See, e.g., BP Kemi/DDSF, 22 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 286) 32 (1979), [1979] 3 Comm.
Mkt. L.R. 684; criticized by Korah, Competition, 1980 J. Bus. L. 195, 220 (Section Editorial).
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the Community Court. Where the Commission's position is clear, the
national court should dispose of the case without adjournment. It ob-
served that often only certain clauses are in dispute before the national
court. Since these clauses would remain valid, even if other clauses
were condemned, the national court could proceed to a decision. The
Commission also submitted that the national court might dispose of the
case when it was clear whether an exemption would be granted. Al-
though sensible, this seems very dubious. The Commission is saying
that the national court may enforce a clause that infringes Article 85(1)
if in its view, the Commission would clearly exempt the agreement
were it to open proceedings on an agreement notified before the period
in issue, or dispensed from notification. Surely this would amount to
granting the exemption which only the Commission has power to do.
39
What the Commission submits to the Court is in no way a binding
precedent, unless adopted by the Court.
Old Agreements
Whatever the position of new agreements might be, the Court con-
firmed the validity of old agreements in De Bloos v. Bouyer.4 ° Bouyer
had appointed de Bloos as its exclusive dealer in Belgium and Luxem-
bourg and was being sued for damages for selling to another dealer.
According to Advocate General Mayras, the agreement included an ex-
port ban, which would not only have prevented the group exemption
granted by Regulation 67/67 from applying, but would also have made
it virtually certain that the Commission would not grant an individual
exemption to the agreement without modification. Were the agreement
held to be valid, de Bloos would have been entitled to substantial dam-
ages for loss of his exclusivity. Consequently, as Advocate General
Mayras pointed out, it was virtually certain that Bouyer would not
have agreed to modify the agreement to enable it to be validated under
Article 7 of the Regulation, he would have been advised, instead, to
plead the invalidity of the contract. Nevertheless, the Court ruled that
[d]uring the period between notification and the date on which the Com-
mission takes a decision, courts before which proceedings are brought re-
lating to an old agreement duly notified or exempted from notificationa '
39 But see text accompanying notes 114-116 infra.
40 [1977] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2359, [1978] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 511. See A. Marchini-Camia,
A Propos des 4nciennes' Ententes, C.D.E. 3 (1979).
41 As in Bilger v. Jehle, f19701 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 127, 11974] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 382, and
contrary to Brasserie de Haecht (No. 2), [1973] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 77, [1973] Comm. Mkt. L.R.
287, the Court appears to be treating agreements dispensed from notification as enjoying provi-
sional validity. The agreement in question, however, had been notified in time, unlike that in de
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must give such an agreement the legal effects attributed thereto under the
law applicable to the contract, and those effects cannot be called in ques-
tion by any objection which may be raised concerning its compatibility
with Article 85(l).42
This judgment increased the juridical certainty conferred by old
agreements. It could no longer be argued. that a national judge could
decide that an old agreement duly notified was invalid even for the
future. Moreover, however convinced the national judge may be that
the agreement infringes Article 85, he can not invoke the Community
law to adjourn the case in order to give the Commission a chance to
condemn it.43 An undertaking wanting to rely on the nullity of such an
agreement should make a complaint to the Commission and wait until
the Commission has condemned the provision before infringing it.
To what extent would a decision have retroactive effect on the pro-
visional validity of an agreement? In De Bloos, the Court speaks of
validity between the time of notification and a decision by the Commis-
sion, and it is thought that the contract cannot be void by virtue of
Article 85(2) until the date of the decision,4' or possibly the date on
Haecht (No. 2), and technically the Commission might have been able to grant an exemption
under Article 7 although, owing to the reasons which Bouyer had for not agreeing to abrogate the
export ban, the possibility was purely theoretical. The Court's reasoning stated that provisional
validity was to last between the date of notification and the Commission's decision, which seems
to imply that the Court was referring to agreements which had been notified, even if dispensed by
Article 5(2) of the Regulation.
The Court also referred to the indivisibility of Article 85(1) and (3), an argument used by the
Court in Bosch, and which applies equally to new agreements. The late Professor Van Damme
told me in conversation that from this, some experts were inferring that the Court was thinking of
extending provisional validity to new agreements and overruling the second de Haecht case. In
fact, it has since done the opposite. In the Pevu/ume case, it has greatly reduced the number of
agreements enjoying provisional validity.
42 De Bloos v. Bouyer, [1977] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 2371-2372, [19781 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R.
at 529.
43 The question is discussed more fully in Marchini-Camia, note 40 supra.
44 In de Haecht (No. 2), the Court did say "such nullity is therefore likely to affect all the
effects, past or future, of the agreement or decision," [1973] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 89, [1973]
Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 304, without distinguishing between new and old agreements. But it had
stressed the distinction earlier, id. at 86-87, [1973] Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 302, and it is thought that
the later part of the judgment should be read in the light of that distinction, so as to apply only to
new agreements.
The Dutch and Belgian governments did argue in the Perfume cases that provisional validity
should end only when a national court so declared. This was not, however, in the context of a
decision but rather in the context of an administrative letter saying that there was no reason for
the Commission to intervene, and that the file was being closed. Where an agreement has been
formally condemned under Article 3 of the Regulation, there seems to be nothing to be said for
having to go to a national court to be able to disregard the contract. See notes 13-14 and accom-
panying text supra.
If old agreements do remain valid in respect of the period before the Commission makes a
decision, there seems to be no need for Article 7 of the Regulation to validate an agreement
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which the parties are ordered to terminate their infringement. The pol-
icy which requires juridical certainty relates to the time when a contract
is made and when the parties commit resources to its implementation,
not just the moment when its validity is challenged in a national court.
There would be little point in granting the full validity mentioned in
Portelange and confirmed in Bilger and De Bloos if a subsequent deci-
sion by the Commission could reverse it retroactively.45
It is thought that third parties cannot claim that an agreement is
void while it still binds the parties, because the parties to the agreement
might then be in an impossible position if required by a third party to
ignore exclusivity granted under a clause that the other party might
enforce.
Paucity of Formal Decisions by the Commission
When Regulation 17 was enacted, it was envisaged that most
agreements notified would be dealt with by decision: either they would
be cleared under Article 2, validated under Articles 6 or 7, or con-
demned under Article 3. All three remedies bind the parties, but re-
quire the Commission to make a decision.46  The procedures for
making decisions, however, are cumbersome47 and take considerable
time. In 1979, fewer than ten decisions were made under the EEC
Treaty, though in some years over a dozen have been published. Nev-
ertheless, the Commission has managed to deal with most of the agree-
ments notified to it informally.48 Frequently, after some investigation,
retrospectively if the agreement is later made to comply with Article 85. See notes 15-16 and
accompanying text supra.
45 See Portelange v. Smith Corona Marchant Int'l., [1969] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 309, [1974] 1
Comm. Mkt. L.R. 397; Bilgerv. Jehle, [1970] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 127, [1974] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R.
382. See also note 29 supra.
46 By virtue of Article 189 of the Treaty a decision is binding on those to whom it is addressed.
By virtue of Article 190, it must state the reasons on which it is based. It is not clear how far the
Commission can delegate its discretionary powers, and certainly decisions made under Articles 2,
3, 6 or 7 of the Regulation must be made by the Members acting collegially and not merely by
officials in D.G. IV. Within two months, those to whom a decision has been addressed are entitled
to apply to the Community Court under Article 173 to annul it, on the grounds that it is contrary
to the Treaty. Regulation 17 provides for such decisions to be published, and also provides that
the parties shall have an opportunity to present their views to the Commission. Further proce-
dural safeguards are prescribed in Reg. 99/63. O.3. EuR. COMM. 47 (Spec. Ed. 1963-1964). See
Korah, supra note 25, at 30-34.
47 The decision-making process is lucidly described by Frances Graupner, Commission Deci-
sion-.Making on Competitive Questions 10 COMM. MKT. L. REv. 291, (1973). I am told that the
article remains basically accurate, although, a few details have been changed. The decision mak-
ing process, however, remains confidential, and it is impossible for someone not working for the
Commission to know.
48 In Guerlain, the Commission stated that out of 32,017 old agreements notified, the files on
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a senior official signs a "comfort letter" stating that the file is being
closed. Such a letter may say that the Commission sees no reason to
intervene, in view of the small market shares affected; 49 that the Com-
mission considers that the agreement comes within a group exemp-
tion;5" or that the Commission merely states that in view of
amendments made by the parties, it intends to take no action. I have
seen one letter in which the Commission stated that "all benefits which
normally arise from notification are, of course, safeguarded;" and an-
other in which the Commission stated that it proposed to take no fur-
ther steps, though it added that this would not preclude it from
changing its mind. The Commission disposes informally of several
hundred cases a year, though it is not known how many files are closed
with the issue of such a letter.
The Perfume Cases
Most of the French and other perfume manufacturers notified se-
lective distribution agreements to the Commission. Each manufacturer
supplied retailers in its home Member State, and a single distributor for
each of the others, which agreed to supply only such retailers as it
should appoint within its territory. The Commission treated the distri-
bution networks of Dior, Lanc6me and Rochas as test cases. It went as
far as to issue points of objection: to specify the reasons for thinking
these agreements were caught by Article 85(1) and to hear the parties.
At that point each manufacturer was willing to abrogate resale price
30,840 had been closed. [1980] E. Comm. J. Rep. 2327, 2361 n.l. Of the 1177 remaining, 889
relate to licenses, mostly patent licenses, and most are likely to be disposed of when the group
exemption for patent licenses is made, possibly in 1982. The Commission claims that about 2600
of the agreements not yet disposed of, said to be 63 percent of the total, related to patent licenses,
so there must be just over 4000 agreements new and old not yet finalized. EUROPEAN COMMUNI-
TIES COMMISSION, NINTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 20, para. 7 (1980).
49 See, e.g., the Perfume cases, except for Lauder, where the letter was more general. The
market was widely defined to comprise perfumes, toiletries and other beauty products. This may
have been right as the makers of some of these products could probably switch to making the
others.
The Court has ruled that an agreement infringes Article 85(l) only if the actual or intended
effects are perceptible. See note 97 infra. In a highly unreliable notice on minor agreements the
Commission stated its opinion that where the group of companies to which the parties belong
have an aggregate market turnover of less than 50 million units of account and aggregate market
shares of less than five percent, the agreement is not caught. Notice concerning agreements of
minor importance, 20 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 313) 3 (1977), [1978] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 648. The
unit of account used for competition is the budgetary unit, based on a basket of currencies and
quoted daily. On November 4, 1981, it was quoted at $1.09681.
50 See De Bloos v. Bouyer, [1977] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2359, [1978] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 511.
C.S. KERSE, EEC ANTITRUST PROCEDURE (1981), states at para. 10.10, that they vary considera-
bly in content.
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maintenance, and allow any dealer in its network to buy from any
other, whether in the same country or not. Consequently, a senior offi-
cial of the Commission wrote letters to each manufacturer stating that
in view of its small market share-under 5 per cent in any Member
State-the considerable number of competitors of similar size, and the
abrogation of resale price maintenance and restrictions on dealing with
other franchised dealers in the network, the Commission saw no reason
to intervene under Article 85(l),51 although it would check to see that
these restrictions were in fact abrogated. Over the next few months,
letters were sent to most other Common Market perfume
manufacturers.5 u
Some time later, litigation regarding these arguments was started
in France and the Netherlands, and the Community Court was asked
to give preliminary rulings about the status of these letters. In the
French litigation, excluded retailers sued either in tort, or as civil par-
ties to a prosecution, on the ground that a particular manufacturer had
refused to supply them. 3 In the Dutch cases, the manufacturer sued
excluded retailers for unfair competition: the excluded retailers alleg-
51 In Metro v. Commission, [1977] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1875, [1978] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 1, the
Court confirmed the practice of the Commission in stating that in principle, selective distribution
systems are not caught by Article 85(1) where all suitably qualified dealers are appointed
provided that resellers are chosen on the basis of objective criteria of a qualitative nature
relating to the professional qualifications of the reseller and his staff and the suitability of his
trading premises and that such conditions are laid down uniformly for all potential resellers
and are not applied in a discriminatory fashion.
Id. at 1904, [1978] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 30.
In practice, satisfying such qualifications tends to be expensive, so in order to persuade deal-
ers to make the necessary investment, a manufacturer usually has to promise not to appoint too
many dealers in the neighbourhood. Such quantitative restrictions are normally treated by the
Commission as caught by Article 85(1), but have been exempted in the case of complex durables:
Omega watches, BMW cars, and S4BAM TV sets. Mr. J. Ferry, the official in charge of individ-
ual cases in D.G. IV, stated at a conference organized by ESC in October, 1980, that suppliers are
free to choose with whom they deal themselves, but may not restrain distributors or wholesalers'
choice of customers: an odd distinction to justify on policy grounds. InLancome and L'Oreal, the
Court stressed that such quantitative protection is normally caught by the prohibition of Article
85(l), and that in assessing whether it is, the existence of similar selective distribution systems by
competitors is relevant. Lancfme v. Heijn Supermart, [1980] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 2511, [1981]
2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 164, 178; L'Oreal v. DeNieuwe, [1980] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 3775, [1981] 2
Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 253. In L'Oreal the Court stressed that it is not so much the juridical nature
of the restriction as its effects on competition and inter-state trade that are relevant. Id. at 3791,
[1981] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 253. But see note 37 supra.
52 EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES COMMISSION, FOURTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 24,
para. 35 (1975); EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES COMMISSION, FIFrH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY
51, para. 57 (1976). See also Procureur de la Republique (and others) v. Giry and Guerlain (and
others), [1980] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2327, 2340-41, [1981] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 99, 107 [Pefume
cases] and the Commission's submissions in Guerlain, [1980] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2327, 2340-41.
53 The prosecutions were brought under the French ordinance 45-1830 of June 30, 1945, as
amendedby decree of June 24, 1958, against Guerlain, Rochas, Lanvin, and Nina Ricci. Perfume
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edly had persuaded franchised dealers to break their contracts and sup-
ply the defendant.54 In the various Perfume cases, the Community
Court made several rulings. In the French prosecution against the
manufacturer Guerlain and others, the Court decided that "Community
law does not prevent the application of national provisions prohibiting
a refusal to sell even where the agreements relied upon for the purpose
of justifying this refusal to sell have been classified55 by the
Commission."5 6
The most important ruling for the purposes of this article, was that
made in Lancbme. The Court in that case ruled that
[a]n administrative letter informing the person concerned that the Com-
mission is of the opinion that there are no grounds for it to take action
with regard to agreements which have been notified pursuant to the pro-
visions of Article 85(1) has the effect of terminating the period of provi-
sional validity accorded from the date of notification to agreements made
prior to 13 March 1962 notified within the period laid down in Article
5(1) of Regulation No. 17 or exempted from notification. The opinions
expressed in such a letter are not binding on the national courts but con-
stitute a factor which the latter may take into account in examining
whether the agreements are in accordance with the provisions of Article
85.
57
In reaching its result the Court examined its earlier decisions in
which it had developed the doctrine of provisional validity. In Porte-
lange the Court had stressed that only agreements that "may not bene-
fit from" an exemption under Article 85(3) are void and that an
exemption could not be granted by a national court: legal certainty
required that these agreements that might later be exempted retrospec-
tively should remain valid.5" Moreover, the Court in Lanebme added
that after sending a letter stating that it intends to close the file, the
Commission is unlikely to take a decision exempting the agreement; so
there remains no further justification for maintaining provisional
cases, [1980] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 2340, [1981] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 133. Anne Marty sued
Estee Lauder civilly, Anne Marty v. Estee Lauder, [1980] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2481, 2496.
54 LancOme v. Etos and Heijn Supermart, [1980] Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 2516, [1981] 2 Comm.
Mkt. L.R. at 168; L'Oreal v. DeNieuwe, [1980] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 3777, [1981] 2 Comm.
Mkt. L.R. at 238.
55 Classbfed is a poor translation of the French classk meaning that the file has been closed.
56 The author discusses this aspect of the Perfume cases in Korah, supra note 25, at 24-26. See
also Verstrynge, Relationsh/p between National and Community Antitrust Law: An Overview After
the Peffume Cases, 3 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 358 (1981).
57 Lanc~me v. Etos and Albert Heijn Supermart, [1980] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 2511, [1981] 2
Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 179.
58 Portelange v. Smith Corona Marchant Int'l, [1969] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 309, [1974] 1
Comm. Mkt. L.R. 397.
Provisional Validiy and the Rule of Reason
3:320(1981)
validity.59
The ruling in Lancbrme has caused considerable concern. Most of
the "old" agreements notified by the Commission have already been
dealt with;60 an unknown number of them by closing the file and send-
ing an administrative letter. It had been assumed, since De Bloos that
these old agreements would remain valid, even for the future, at least
until the Commission should condemn them.61 Now it seems that they
become invalid, as soon as the Commission sends such a letter, even
after the agreement has been modified to meet any objections the Com-
mission may have had.
Although Lancbme was decided in July 1980, and has only re-
cently been reported, it has been criticized. 2 When the parties modify
an agreement in order to meet the Commission's objection, the agree-
ment-as a result of Lancbme-loses its provisional validity. This may
encourage firms to delay compliance with the Commission's views and
discourage informal settlements of the least obnoxious cases, which
would release resources to deal with hard core infringements. Of
course, the Court did state that national courts should take the Com-
mission's view into account, and in many cases it may be followed.
Unfortunately, however, the Commission's administrative letters stat-
ing that a file is being closed tend to be very short and do not include
much market analysis. The letters in the Perfume cases referred only to
the small market share of each manufactuer, the abrogation of resale
price maintenance, and the new freedom for franchised dealers to buy
from anyone in the network. Most perfume manufacturers, however,
59 Lanc6me v. Etos and Albert Heijn Supermart, [1980] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2511, [1981] 2
Comm. Mkt. L.R. 164.
60 See note 48 and accompanying text supra.
61 Advocate General Mayras had said in that case that it was no longer appropriate to speak
of provisional validity, and advised that the validity should be absolute.
62 See, ag., Korah, Competition, 1980 J. Bus. L. 423, 425 (Section Editorial); Korah, note 25
supra. J. Maitland Walker also criticized the ruling as cutting back provisional validity, as having
the ludicrous result that the parties are worse off if the Commission writes to say that it is not
intervening under Article 85(1) and that it is closing the file, and as enabling the Commission to
deprive agreements of their provisional validity merely by letter stating that it proposes to take no
action and so avoiding the burdensome need to issue a formal decision. Maitland Walker, 1 EUR.
CoMPETrrioN L. REv. 243 (1980).
He also pointed out that not only is the ruling difficult to reconcile with De Bloos, but also
that in its judgment in Vereniging ter Bevordeering van de Belangen des Boekhandels v. Eldi
Records, [1980] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1137, [1980] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 719, motif 13, the Commu-
nity Court observed that a letter requesting information under Article 11 of Reg. 17 "cannot alter
the effects of notification." That dictum might be distinguished on the ground that the Commis-
sion may well grant an exemption after requesting further information, although it is unlikely to
do so when it has closed the file. It will be submitted that not every letter sent by the Commission
deprives an agreement of its provisional validity.
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used a selective distribution system, 63 although it seems that cut price
retailers had difficulty in obtaining supplies. Consequently, a national
court may decide that the agreements are in fact perceptibly anti-com-
petitive. If comfort letters are to have effects in national law, then it
may be argued that they amount to decisions, and should be supported
by more complete reasoning.64 This may result in rather more care
being taken over their preparation, but reduce their attractiveness to
the Commission.
If the Commission is to be able to cope with all the agreements
notified to it and devote resources to discovering unnotified agree-
ments, especially those providing for price fixing, market sharing, or
collective boycotts, it will have to find some way of short circuiting
some of the cases. The Council of Ministers, which must approve new
posts, consists of representatives of Member States. It has always been
jealous of the Commission's executive power, and constrained its exer-
cise by not permitting the bureaucracy to grow. One might have hoped
that D.G.IV would have concentrated its resources on hard core cartels,
where it is fairly clear that intervention will yield useful results. Unless
national courts are to take a Chicago view of vertical restraints, and say
that few restrict competition,65 the "automatic" sanction of nullity will
endanger their enforcement. The inability of the Commission to
63 The Court has ruled that analysis of the whole market is necessary to determine the effects
of an agreement on competition and interstate trade. See text accompanying note 24 supra. This
was confirmed by the ruling in Lanime, [1980] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2511, [1981] 2 Comm. Mkt.
L.R. 164, which was repeated in L'Oreal:
The agreements laying down a selective distribution system based on criteria for admission
which go beyond a mere objective selection of a qualitative nature exhibit features making
them incompatible with Article 85(1) where such agreements, either individually or together
with others, may in the economic and legal context in which they occur and on the basis of a
set of objective factors of law or of fact, affect trade between member-states and have either
as their objective or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition.
L'Oreal v. DeNeiuwe, [1980] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3775, 3795, [1981] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 235, 256
(emphasis added).
6 4 This is rather a technical subject for non-European readers. I have argued that a comfort
letter depriving an old agreement of its provisional validity is, indeed, a decision. See Korah, note
25 supra. Such a comfort letter, therefore, must comply with the rules for decisions. See note 46
supra See also JOLIET, LE DROIT INSTITUTIONNEL DES COMMUNAUTE: LE CONTENTIEUX 65
(1981).
65 A recent, lucid and cogent description of the analysis typical of the Chicago school, is given
in R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADox: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF (1978). It is argued that
in the absence of any horizontal restraints, a supplier would not give greater protection to his
dealers, or a patentee to his licensee, than is necessary to persuade him to make the investments
necessary to the promotion or production of the product, since he would benefit from a more
competitive market downstream and more would be sold. The limitation of this argument, under
which resale price maintenance is not anticompetitive, is that horizontal agreements may not al-
ways be discovered. Moreover, foreclosing practices may be adopted by several manufacturers
and patentees consciously adopting parallel devices. See also R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN
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render many decisions will result in very different application of the
antitrust rules in the different national courts of the Community66 and
to great uncertainty as to the validity of ancillary restraints.
What kind of administrative letter from the Commission deprives
an agreement of its provisional validity? The Court's rulings together
with the reasons given for them suggest that they do so, only when they
show that the Commission is unlikely to reopen the file and grant a
formal exemption. 7 Yet, this is hard to reconcile with the Commis-
sion's decision in De Bloos. The Commission there had stated that it
was closing the file on the ground that the exclusive dealing agreement
came within the exemption granted by Regulation 67/67 to exclusive
dealing agreements. Once the Commission discovered the export ban
which had not been mentioned in the notification, it would surely have
reopened the case and condemned at least that clause, and refused to
exempt the agreement unless that clause was deleted. 8 It is thought
that the two cases cannot be reconciled, and that one must treat De
Bloos as having been overruled on this point. 9 If provisional validity
is terminated only when the Commission is not likely to grant an ex-
emption, even if it is later decided that an agreement infringes Article
85(1) and does not enjoy the benefit of any of the group exemptions,
the scope of the precedent in relation to old agreements may be greatly
limited.
In any event, it is thought that the precedent, which does not fit in
happily with the earlier rulings of the Court, should be limited to the
ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE (2d ed. 1980). See also White, Vertical Restraints in Antitrust Law: a
Coherent Model, XXVI ANTITRUST BULL. 327 (1981).
66 The German cartel law is not unlike the American, and both the legislation and the practice
of the Bunderskartellamt are far more severe towards horizontal than vertical agreements. The
French tend to place more emphasis on refusals to supply on fair terms. These contrasted atti-
tudes must reflect on the prejudices of the judges in the national courts. Italy still has no domestic
law proscribing restrictions on competition, and that of Belgium is not very effective.
67 See C.S. KER sE, EEC ANTITRUST PROCEDURE, para. 10.10 (1981). Had this excellent book
been published when this article was being prepared, far more references would have been made
to it.
68 De Bloos v. Bouyer, [19771 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2359, [1979] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 511.
Bouyer would almost certainly have refused to delete the clause. As Advocate General Mayras
had suggested in his opinion, it would have paid Bouyer to rely on the invalidity of the export ban,
to prevent the granting of an exemption to the exclusivity, thereby enabling him to defeat the
claim under Belgian law for compensation for not dealing exclusively with a validly appointed
exclusive dealer.
69 The practice of the Court hardly ever to refer to its earlier judgments makes it particularly
difficult to decide when an earlier case is being distinguished and when it is being overruled.
Advocates General frequently refer to earlier precedents, including the opinions of other Advo-
cates General, but this does not always suffice when the Court has departed from earlier
precedents.
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kind of administrative letter in issue in Lancame: one "informing the
party concerned that the Commission is of the opinion that there are no
grounds for it to take action with regard to agreements which have
been notified pursuant to the provisions of Article 85(l). "70 It may be
limited even further in that had the Commission informed the Court
that it had considered that the agreement was caught by Article 85(1), it
would not have granted an exemption.71
Nevertheless, the Court now appears to disapprove strongly of
provisional validity and it is thought that the Court is very unlikely to
reverse the second Brasserie de Haecht case and extend the doctrine to
new agreements.
EFFECTS OF POSSIBLE NULLITY ON BUSINESS DYNAMISM: THE NEED
FOR A RULE OF REASON
The Commission is able to dispose by formal decision of only a
very small proportion of the agreements notified to it, and few agree-
ments now enjoy provisional validity.72 Consequently, businessmen
agreeing to collaborate in ways that may increase important competi-
tive pressures in the Common Market but restrict others, will have to
rely on national courts to interpret Article 85 realistically, should they
need to enforce their contracts. The writer is not concerned about the
inability to enforce the kind of agreement subject toper se prohibition
under the Sherman Act:73 naked price fixing, market sharing, and col-
lective boycotts, especially the kind of collective arrangements for re-
ciprocal exclusive dealing between manufacturers and various classes
70 Lanc6me v. Heijn Supermart, [1980] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2511, 2535, [1981] Comm. Mkt.
L.R. 164, 179.
71 The Commission told the Court in Guerlain, [1980] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2327, 2352, that it
would not have been prepared to exempt the selective distribution system, had it been caught by
Article 85(1). Presumably, the same applies to the Lancbme agreement.
72 See note 48 supra.
73 There are difficulties at the margin: do the regulations of commodity exchange restraining
bargains out of hours except at closing prices fix prices? See Chicago Board of Trade v. United
States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918). If the prices are arrived at by the interplay of supply and demand
during the open session, the evils of price fixing may be lacking-supply may not be restricted in
order to raise price. It is impossible to say ex hypothesi whether the development of a common
trade mark is an excuse for market sharing between the shopkeepers who are promoting it, or
whether the market sharing is ancillary to the development of the mark which enabled small- and
medium-sized regional supermarket chains to compete with larger ones. The Supreme Court may
have got it wrong in Topeo Associates v. United States, 405 U.S. 596 (1972), although the terms of
the order by the District Court on remand may have made this unimportant. The current
Supreme Court with its greater interest in the market context of transactions might now go the
other way. See Bock, 4nttrust and the Supreme Court-an Economic Expianaton, CONFERENCE
BOARD INFORMATION BULL., No. 73.
Provisional Validity and the Rule of Reason
3:320(1981)
of trader that completely tie up commerce in many consumer products
in Benelux.74 These are so unlikely to bring any benefits either to con-
sumers or the economy as a whole that the sanction of nullity may be
justifiable even if it is not very effective. The Commission cannot im-
pose fines when an agreement has been notified to it for the period
before it makes a decision under Articles 3 or 15(6) of Regulation 17,
and has been unable to make many decisions.75
Some kinds of collaboration, however, which may add important
competitive pressures to the market may not be commercially attractive
unless other competitive pressures are restricted. The initial investment
may not be made unless the parties can prevent competitors from tak-
ing a free ride on their efforts. For example, a prospective patent licen-
see may be faced with the need to invest in tooling up to produce a
product that may never have been sold before, and the production of
which on a commercial scale may prove impossible or unexpectedly
expensive. If the project fails, he will make a loss, which will have to
be balanced by a chance to make high profits at least for a time should
he succeed. He may need to be assured that the clause in his license
guaranteeing exclusivity will be enforceable if he is to make the initial
investment, or if he needs to obtain credit to do so.
7 6
A similar argument can be made for a dealer who is to promote a
new or little known product. Maintaining stocks, finding retailers pre-
pared to handle the product, and advertising it, for example, are costly
functions and the return on the investment may be uncertain and
delayed for several years. A brand owner may find it impossible to
penetrate a market efficiently unless he can protect his dealer from free
74 See, ag., FEDET4B, [1980] E. Comm. J. Rep. 3125, [1981] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 134, or the
Dutch Bicycle case, 21 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 20) 1 (1978), [1979] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 11.
75 In one decision, Groupement de Fabricants de Papiers Peints, [1975] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep.
1941, [1976] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 589, the Commission did give rather short reasoning in condemn-
ing a collective boycott against a dealer advertising cut prices, but the Court admonished it for not
spelling out more fully the likely effects on inter-state trade. The Court did not encourage the
Commission to make many rather summary decisions of hard core infringements, unless it spelled
out how trade between Member States would be affected. In that case, however, it would not have
been very difficult to recite that attempts to maintain prices in Belgium that would be expected to
attract imports. The aggregate rebate scheme which formed part of the Groupement's distribution
system made second sourcing less profitable and must have discouraged imports, although the
parties undertook to include for rebate purposes a trader's purchases from German (though not
other) manufacturers.
76 Under Article 85(3), the Commission has taken this risk into account, see, e.g., Davidson
Rubber, 15 J.O. Comm. EuR. (No. L 143) 31 (1972), [1972] Comm. Mkt. L.R. D52. It seems from
the tenth recital to the draft group exemption for patent licenses, 22 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. C 58)
12 (1979), [1979] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 478, that it is only the difficulty a small firm may have in
raising capital that concerns the Commission, although one might have expected large firms to
subject investment projects to a discounted cash flow analysis that would be affected by risk.
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riders, particularly in the early years. It is not always efficient for the
brand owner to do such work himself, and not always possible to see
that any cash given to the dealer to recompense him for his services is
actually well spent. The ability to enforce exclusivity, even reinforced
by restrictions on resale by other dealers, may be vital. In the United
States, since Sylvania,77 such agreements have been governed by the
rule of reason.
Where there is adequate competition from other brands, many
economists would argue that there is no need for a court to consider the
difficult question how much protection is needed, since the brand own-
er or patentee has an interest in his product remaining competitive and
may be expected to protect his own interests by granting the minimum
protection necessary.7"
In both these kinds of vertical agreements, if protection is needed
to attract the collaboration, no competition is restricted that could exist
without the ancillary restraints. The case of joint ventures is rather dif-
ferent. If two firms collaborate in innovation, their joint venture may
increase competition sooner than either parent could do on its own,
especially if they have complementary technology and facilities; but it
may deter either party from entering the market on its own, subject to
the potential competition of the other. In such a case the restriction or
deterrent to entry by either party does limit potential competition that
might have developed in the absence of the agreement, though its value
may be outweighed by the more effective competition of the joint
venture.
Ever since the Commission's first decisions on exclusive dealing in
1964, its practice, based on German experience,79 has been not to ana-
77 Continental T.V. v. G.T.E. Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36 (1977). For a European view, see Chard,
The Economics of Exclusive Distribution Agreements with Special Reference to EEC Competition
Policy, 25 ANTITRUST BULL. 405 (1980).
78 Even when there is little inter-brand competition, a monopolist will increase his profit by
reducing dealer margins, so he is unlikely to give his dealers more protection than is necessary.
79 R. JOLIET, THE RULE OF REASON IN ANTITRUST LAW: AMERICAN, GERMAN AND COM-
MON MARKET LAWS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 77-106, 116 to end (1967). Joliet has pointed
out that the Commission has followed the practice adopted under Article 1 of the German cartel
law, which applies to horizontal agreements, rather than that adopted under Article 18, which
relates to vertical agreements of the sort with which the Commission was dealing. In a perceptive
and lucid analysis of both the German theory and of the function of Article 85, Joliet has cogently
criticized the Commission's practice. Amongst other arguments, he shows that the German con-
cept used in Article I relates to contractual restrictions on conduct, whereas the concept of "con-
certed practice" under Article 85(l) extends far further, and that effects in the market are vital,
while they are not relevant under Article I of the German law. The Commission has been attack-
ing open price agreements recently, and these do not constrain the parties' freedom to price inde-
pendently, (the German theory), although in concentrated markets, where the information is
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lyze the market under Article 85(1). Instead, the Commission habitu-
ally states that an exclusive dealing agreement is caught by the
prohibition in that the manufacturer is restrained from selling to any
other dealer in the territory and the dealer is restrained from handling
competing goods. It is very rare for the Commission to decide under
Article 85(1) whether the manufacturer could have penetrated a mar-
ket, (particularly one in a different Member State, where language,
commercial habits, and tastes may differ), without protecting a local
dealer from others taking a free ride on his promotion. This is taken
into account, though still in rather a formal manner, under Article
85(3). A national court asked to enforce an ancillary restraint probably
has no power, however, to exempt an agreement under Article 85(3),80
so it is vital that a market analysis should be made before holding that
a restraint is caught by Article 85(1). It will be submitted that a na-
tional court is not precluded from doing so by the judgments of the
Community Court.
The Early Judgments of the Court of Justice
In the first competition case to reach the Court on appeal from a
decision by the Commission, the Court seems to have taken an inter-
mediate view of Article 85(1). In Consten & Grundig v. Commission,81
Grundig had appointed Consten as its exclusive dealer in France, but
increased its protection by various devices, so as to restrain any of its
dealers in Germany and elsewhere from selling Grundig apparatus
within Consten's territory.82 On appeal from the Commission's deci-
sion, 3 the Court may have treated this absolute territorial protection
highly specific, they make it easier for the parties not to compete in price. In Re the GEC- Weir
Agreement, 21 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 327) 26 (1978), [1978] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. D42, the
Commission stated that a joint venture was caught by Article 85(1) in that the substantial interest
of each partner in the venture would deter it from competing with it, whether or not it accepted a
contractual restriction. This is far from the concept used in Article 1 of the German statute.
80 See text accompanying note 116 infra. Moreover, the Commission has granted few
exemptions.
81 [1966] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 299, [1966] Comm. Mkt. L.R. 418.
82 Grndig imposed export bans on its wholesalers in Germany and on its exclusive distribu-
tors in other Member States. Grundig also enabled Consten to register in France the trademark
"Gint" (Grundig International), with which it marked the Grundig apparatus produced at that
period. If valid, this would enable Costen to sue anyone who imported Grundig apparatus from
a German wholesaler for resale in France both for trademark infringement and for the tort of
unfair competition-inciting the dealer to break his own contract with Grundig, when he knew
that Consten had an exclusive franchise for France.
83 7 J.O. CoMm. EUR. 2545 (1964), [1964] Comm. Mkt. L.R. 489.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 3:320(1981)
along national boundaries as aper se infringement.8 4 The applicants
and the German government had argued that the decision condemning
the agreement should be quashed on the ground that the Commission
had considered only the Grundig brand, without analyzing the market
under the rule of reason. Was so much protection required to en-
courage Consten to invest in the promotion in France of a brand that
was known better in Germany?8" The Court responded that one may
not justify a restraint on intra-brand competition merely because it
might increase inter-brand competition, and added that the Commis-
sion is not required "to take account of the concrete effects of an agree-
ment once it appears that it has as its object the prevention, restriction
or distortion of competition."86 This apparently per se rule was ap-
plied, however, only to the complete insulation of the French market.
That aper se rule was applied to export bans in Consten & Grundig
in 1966, when the law was undeveloped is understandable in view of
the vital political objective of market integration. There is little point
in removing government barriers to trade between Member States if
they may be replaced by contractual ones. There is, however, an in-
creasing number of voices suggesting that theper se rule against export
bans or deterrents is misguided, in view of the fact that conditions are
still vastly different in different Member States.87 Once prices are con-
84 [1966] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 299, [1966] Comm. Mkt. L.R. 418, 420-21. See Joliet, supra
note 79, at 164.
85 After referring to IWhie Motors v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 258 (1963), Advocate Gen-
eral Roemer pointed out that the Court should compare the market situation after the agreement
was made with the market situation which would have existed had the agreement not been made.
A concrete examination might show that a manufacturer could not penetrate the market without
protecting an exclusive dealer from competition. If so, the agreement would promote competition.
He added that the Commission should have looked to competition from other brands, as is re-
quired by the German Kartel law, and observed that Grundig's market share was only 17 percent.
See id. at 258. One might add that this was after customs duties and quotas had been abolished
between France and Germany. When the agreement had been made in 1957, Grundig's market
share may well have been virtually nil.
86 Consten & Grundig, [1966] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 299, 342, [19661 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 418,
473.
87 See Bael, Heretical Reflections on the Basic Dogma of EECAntitrust." Single Market Integra-
tion, 10 REVUE SUISSE DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL DE LA CONCURRENCE 39 (1980); Korah,
"Goodbye," Red Label- Condemnation of Dual Pricing by Distillers, 3 EUR. L. REV. 62 (1978);
Baden Fuller, Price Variations-The Distillers Case and Article 85 EEC, 28 INT'L & COMP. L.Q.
128 (1979). In his opinion in Distillers Company Limited v. Commission, [1980] E. Comm. Ct. J.
Rep. 2229, 2247, [1980] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 121, 146-54, Advocate General Warner demonstrated
that since the U.K. market was very competitive and Distiller's competitors soldlittle on the Con-
tinent, and since in France and other Continental countries, the product bore discriminatory taxes,
(which have since been condemned by the Court), distillers could not sell at the same price in both
areas. Advocate General Warner said that as a result, the Commission should have taken this into
account when considering whether to grant an exemption to the export deterrents imposed on
Provisional Validity and the Rule of Reason
3:320(1981)
trolled by law at low levels in one Member State, the only thing that a
firm may do to prevent seepage to other Member States may be to stop
supplying the controlled market or to promote different brands, 8 if ex-
port bans and deterrents are necessarily illegal. Nevertheless, the Com-
mission continues to condemn export restrictions, without considering
whether they are justified by price control in the country of export, 9
and its decisions are confirmed by the Court. 90
In relation to the export bans, but not to the exclusivity restric-
tions,91 the Court stated in Consten that "[t]here is no need to take ac-
count of the concrete effects of an agreement once it appears that it has
as its object92 the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition.
'93
United Kingdom dealers, which were a necessary adjunct to a dual pricing policy. In Distillers,
the parties conceded that the export deterrent fell within the prohibition of Article 85(1), so Advo-
cate General Warner did not consider the contrary possibility. Unfortunately, the Court consid-
ered that the agreement had not been properly notified, and so it did not have to consider whether
a justification of the dual pricing and ancillary export deterrent should have been considered
before refusing an exemption. Dr. Baden Fuller suggested that the prohibition of the export deter-
rent may have delayed the integration of the market. See 6 EUR. L. REv. 162 (1981). When the
Commission's decision was made, Distillers separated its brands in the two disparate areas, and
now that France has removed the discrimination between brandy and whisky, it will be more
difficult to take advantage of this, with different brands known in the two areas. See also Bishop,
44 MoD. L. REv. 282 (1981) and Chard, note 77 supra.
88 Unless the products are physically differentiated, however, it may not be possible to use the
mark of one Member State to prevent a parallel importer from buying goods sold in another
Member State, relabeling or repacking them under the local mark and selling the goods. To do so
would infringe the principle of the free movement of goods. See Centrafarm v. American Home
Products Corp., [1978] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1823, [1979] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 326; Hoffman-La
Roche v. Centrafarm, [1978] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1139, [1978] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 217.
89 Johnson & Johnson, 23 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 377) 16 (1980), [1981] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R.
287.
90 See, eg., Miller International Schallplatten v. Commission, [1978] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep.
131, 148, [1978] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 334, 355, where the Court stated:
In this connection, it must be held that, by its very nature, a clause prohibiting exports
constitutes a restriction on competition, whether it is adopted at the instigation of the supplier
or of the customer, since the agreed purpose of the contracting parties is the endeavor to
isolate a part of the market. (emphasis added).
Seealso B.M.W. Belgium v. Commission, [1979] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2435, [1980] 1 Comm. Mkt.
L.R. 370, (where the lower prices in the country from which exports were restricted were caused
by price control that did not exist in the country of import, and which appears to have been
illegal); Public Minister v. Danis, [1979] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3327, [1980] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R.
492, discussed by Emil Paulis in The Danis Case: Reconciling Statutory Price Controls With the
Free Movement of Goods, 2 EUR. COMPETITION L. REv. 163 (1980).
91 The Court quashed the first paragraph of the Commission's order on the ground that it had
not given sufficient reasons for condemning these. Consten & Grundig, [1966] E. Comm. Ct. J.
Rep. 299, [1966] Comm. Mkt. L.R. 418.
92 Article 85, set out in note 1 supra, prohibits agreements that have the object or effect of
restricting competition within the Common Market. The French word objet means both the ob-
jective and the means by which it is to be obtained. Even if Grundig's objective was to increase
the sale of Grundig products in France, this was to be achieved at least partially by clauses re-
stricting the conduct of the parties: Grundig was not to make direct deliveries to anyone else in
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It added, in relation to the exclusivity (which is not one of the examples
of an anticompetitive term listed in Article 85(1)), that the Commission
had rightly taken into account the whole Grundig distribution system
and that the agreement should be assessed in its whole legal and eco-
nomic context. The Court, therefore, quashed the Commission's deci-
sion in so far as it failed to say why these parts of the agreement were
not severable from the absolute territorial protection, and as it failed to
give reasons why they fell within the prohibition of Article 85(1). It is
thought that this amounts to accepting the appropriateness of a rule of
reason to be applied under Article 85(1).
Before giving judgment in Consten & Grundi, the Court heard ar-
gument in La Technique Minibre v. Maschinenbau Ulm,94 a case relat-
ing to the validity of an exclusive agreement, unsupported by export
bans, not been notified in due time, so could not be exempted under
Article 85(3). The Court can hardly have changed its mind in between.
After observing that the conditions which have the "object or effect of
restricting. . . competition" in Article 85(1) were in the alternative, the
Court referred to
[t]he need to consider the precise purpose of the agreement, in the eco-
nomic context in which it is to be applied. This interference with compe-
tition ... must result from all or some of the clauses of the agreement
itself. Where, however, an analysis of the said clauses does not reveal the
effect on competition to be sufficiently deleterious, the consequences of
the agreement should then be considered and for it to be caught by the
prohibition it is then necessary to find that those factors are present which
show that competition has in fact been prevented or restricted or distorted
to an appreciable extent.
95
The Court seems to have recognized distinction between certain
restrictions, such as export bans being subject to aper se prohibition
and others to a rule of reason. Certainly, the Court went on to pro-
pound the need for a market analysis in relation to an agreement ap-
pointing an exclusive dealer who is protected from direct sales to
competitors. While, however, the American distinction, so lucidly ex-
plained in the early case law, is based on the likelihood of the restric-
the territory, nor Consten to handle competing goods. If this was necessary to enable Grundig to
penetrate a new market in a country with which its Member State had been at war only twelve
years previously and where customs quotas had not yet been abolished, the mechanism may have
been to restrict conduct, but the writer would hope that it was not to restrict competition.
93 Consten & Grundig, [1966] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 299, 342, [1966] Comm. Mkt. L.R. 418,
473 (emphasis added).
94 [1966] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 235, [1966] Comm. Mkt. L.R. 357. See Joliet, supra note 79, at
166-173.
95 La Technique Mini~re v. Maschinenbau ULM, [1966] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 235, 249, [19661
Comm. Mkt. L.R. 357, 375.
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tions having beneficial effects on the economy, the Community
distinction is expressed in terms of "object," and the basis is hardly
explained in any of the cases except in terms of the Treaty.
Of course, the EEC test has two requirements: the restrictive
agreement must restrict competition and be capable of affecting inter-
state trade. It does seem that the list of examples at the end of Article
85(1)96 is assumed to restrict competition, unless de minimis. 97 These
include price fixing, and market sharing, but not all kinds of collective
boycott, as well as agreements to tie or discriminate-not so very differ-
ent from the list ofper se offences developed under the Sherman Act.
In relation to other restraints on competition, such as exclusive dealing,
rather more analysis is required, although the Commission's decisions
tend to be very formalistic.
With regard to the inter-state trade condition, the Court's position
is far from clear, as the Court seems to have changed its mind fre-
quently. With regard to export bans and deterrents, it seems that these
are assumed to affect inter-state trade,98 subject only to the same de
minimis rule. Where a restriction on competition affects a whole Mem-
ber State, very little market analysis is required,9 9 and vertical agree-
ments which affect only part of a Member State are caught only if,
together with other similar agreements they are likely to have substan-
tial foreclosing effects. In Brasserie de Haecht (No. 1),100 the Court
pointed out that the effects of an agreement by a small caf6 proprietor
to sell only de Haecht beer should be considered under both tests in the
context of the market, and it would be relevant to consider whether
96 See note 1 supra. See also Groupement des Frabricants de Papiers Peints de Belgique v.
Commission, [1975] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1491, [1976] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 589.
97 Volk v. Vervaecke, [1969] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 295, [1969] Comm. Mkt. L.R. 273.
98 In Miller International Schallplatten, [1978] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 131, [1978] 2 Comm.
Mkt. L.R. 334, the Court refused to consider arguments based on the unlikelihood of German
language records being exported, or that dealers were not interested in export. The Court
concluded:
Miller indeed alleges that the Commission should have established that those clauses had an
appreciable effect on intra-Community trade but that argument cannot be accepted ....
Article 85(l). . . does not require proof that such agreements have in fact appreciably af-
fected such trade, which would moreover be difficult in the majority of cases to establish for
legal purposes, but merely requires that it be established that such agreements are capable of
having that effect. The Commission basing its assessment on Miller's position on the market,
its scale of production, ascertainable exports and price policy, has provided appropriate proof
that in fact there was a danger that trade between Member States would be appreciably
affected.
Id. at 151, [1978] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 353.
99 Groupement des Fabricants de Papiers Peints de Belgique, [1975] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep.
1491, [1976] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 589.
100 Brasserie de Haecht, [1967] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 407, [1968] Comm. Mkt. L.R. 26.
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other cafes were tied.101
More recently, the Court has been concerned with selective distri-
bution systems. In Metro v. Commission,"°2 the Court adopted a con-
cept of workable competition. Although such systems of distribution
may minimize price competition for high quality and technically com-
plex consumer durables-in that case television sets-other forms of
competition may be more important. The Court considered, therefore,
that competition was not restricted when only firms with adequately
qualified staff and suitable premises were selected as dealers. Fulfilling
such criteria tends to be expensive, so often dealers require a further
protection against too many dealers being supplied. The Court made
clear in Metro and in L'Oreal,"°3 however, that such quantitative re-
strictions do infringe Article 85(1), when, in their economic even more
than their legal context, they may affect inter-state trade and have the
object or effect of restricting competition. If most of the suppliers of a
particular product adopt such a policy, it may be difficult for any cut-
price shops to obtain supplies from anyone, and it is thought that Arti-
cle 85(1) would then be infringed.
Practice f the Commission to Apply a Rule of Reason onlyunder Article 85(3)
Despite the insistence by the Court that market analysis is re-
quired before finding that an agreement not of the kind listed in Article
85(1) 10 restricts competition, and may affect trade between Member
States, the Commission in most of its decisions has continued to treat as
incompatible with Article 85(1) any restriction on conduct likely to
have appreciable effects on the market, and to consider the need for
such restrictions only under Article 85(3). The Commission may have
been influenced by the difficulty of making a market analysis in each
case, both for lawyers advising businessmen, and for its officials who
deal with particular cases, most of whom are lawyers. For both lawyers
and Commission officials, it is easier mechanically to point to clauses
101 It is thought that the Court was right. Only if so many caf6s were tied that a new brewery
could not find enough outlets to enter the market with a brewery of a size able to take advantage
of most of the economies of scale enjoyed by existing firms, would the tie keep out equally efficient
firms. Indeed, Advocate General Roemer also pointed to the possibility of a new brewer selling in
supermarkets. It is thought that evidence of the minimum efficient size of a brewery, the number
of free caf6s and the ease of selling products in grocers' stores not known through their cafd sales
would be relevant.
102 [1977] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1875, [1978] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 1.
103 L'Oreal v. De Nieuwe, [1980] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3775, [1981] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 235.
See also Korah, note 25 supra.
104 Nor, of course, export bans.
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that restrict someone's conduct; then the Commission is free to make a
complex economic assessment under Article 85(3) in those cases it in-
vestigates in depth. In several decisions, the Commission did clear
agreements under which small firms accepted restrictions on their con-
duct, on the ground that the effects of the restrictions were im-
perceptible. In S4FCO,1°5 the Commission added that the joint sales
organization through which small French makers of conserves began to
export to Germany, actually increased competition, because they had
not been able to export individually. The agreement was cleared, how-
ever, on the ground that there was no perceptible restriction of compe-
tition, not because the agreement increased more competition than it
restricted.
Where, however, a restriction on conduct was found necessary to
penetrate a new market, the Commission exempted, and did not clear
the agreement. In re Davidson Rubber,106 for instance, Davidson had
granted three separate licenses to manufacturers in three Member
States. Davidson agreed with each licensee to grant no other license in
the licensee's territory without its consent, and each licensee agreed not
to make -or sell outside its territory. The Commission decided that this
protection did infringe Article 85(1); although, once the restriction on
sales was removed, the Commission exempted the agreement. David-
son was constrained not to grant other licenses in each country without
consent, and third parties were restricted from obtaining one. The pro-
cess was important, and so the Commission found that the agreement
was caught by Article 85(1). Nevertheless, the Commission exempted
the agreement on the ground that without the protection of exclusive
manufacturing licenses, the Davidson technology would not have be-
come available in Europe. The writer does not know which part of the
decision was right, but surely, if the protection was necessary to enable
Davidson to penetrate the European market, the agreement should
have been cleared in accordance with the Court's ruling in La Tech-
nique Minibre and even in Consten & Grundi. No practicable potential
competition existed to be restrained. The failure to clear may not have
mattered much to Davidson and its licensees since they obtained an
exemption to which no important conditions were attached, and the
parties may not have pressed the case for clearance.
105 15 J.O. COMM. EuR. (No. L 13) 44 (1972), [1972] Comm. Mkt. L.R. D83, D86.
106 15 J.O. COMM. Eup. (No. L 143) 31 (1972), [1972] Comm. Mkt. L.R. D52.
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The Needfor National Courts to Apply a Rule of Reason
under Article 85(1)
Had Davidson licensed another manufacturer in France, however,
and been sued by its exclusive licensee for breach of the contract grant-
ing exclusivity, the French civil court could probably not have ex-
empted the agreement even if it had been notified to the
Commission.1"7 It could either have said that the agreement was
clearly not caught by the prohibition of Article 85(1) and enforced the
restraint, or adjourned to enable the Commission to make up its
mind. ' 8 It is not even clear whether the French court could have
granted an interlocutory injunction to restrain the subsequent licensee
pending the Commission's decision; but unless at the time the original
licensee was granted the license, or when deciding whether to invest in
tooling up he was advised that the exclusivity would easily be enforced,
the licensee might not have taken the risk at that time. The process was
untried. If it did not work on a commercial scale, the licensee would
lose money. If it did work, a free rider might come along, and reap
where he had sown, taking far less risk once the process had been
proved viable and accepted by customers. If no licensees could be
found in 1959 who were prepared to make the necessary investment,
then the agreement restricted no possible potential competition.
There are other examples of the sort of agreements that must be
made in Europe if its industry is to keep pace technologically with that
in America and Japan. Suppose that the world market for widgets is
highly concentrated and it is thought that within two years a Japanese
widget maker may develop an electronic widget, on which an Ameri-
can firm is also believed to be working. Suppose that a Common Mar-
ket widget maker has no electronic division or subsidiary, and
estimates that it would take five years for it to develop an electronic
widget. That might put the Common Market widget maker perma-
nently out of the electronic widget market. What restrictions may it
insert in a joint research and development contract with an electronic
firm, under which the widget maker will initially instruct the firm about
the technology of widget making, tolerances, etc., so that an electronic
widget can be developed? It may be vital to know, as the bargaining
power of the parties changes over time. In the first year, the widget
107 See notes 114-116 and accompanying text infra.
108 It has been argued that under the law of some Member States an exclusive licensee can
obtain an injunction against a subsequent licensee by virtue of the patent. It is thought, however,
that such an exercise of patent rights, obtained only by virtue of an agreement, would be
subordinated to Article 85, as was the use of the "Gint" mark in Consten & Grundig, note 81 supra.
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technology is being imparted. At the end of the year, the electronic
firm might be able to carry on reasonably well unaided. When the first
generation electronic widget is developed, which party to the contract
has the stronger bargaining power will depend on which holds any pat-
ents and technology.
If the agreement is notified to the Commission, the Commission is
likely these days to impose conditions which help one party more than
the other,1"9 and the whole deal will have to be renegotiated, probably
after the bargaining positions have changed. The Commission might
want to provide for the possibilities of a break of the agreement after
the first generation electronic widget is developed, an invitation waltz
in which each company would be free to pair up with a different part-
ner for the next generation. That, however, might limit the amount of
information exchanged freely for the first generation and so undermine
the project. Many legal advisers in Europe consider that whether to
notify is a management decision, but they point out the disadvantages
in having to renegotiate the deal at least a year after it is made, and the
unlikelihood of obtaining a firm exemption. If a comfort letter is all
that is obtained, the parties may still have difficulty in enforcing the
agreement in a national court. This uncertainty may force the firm
either to try to do all the work itself, (even when that would be less
efficient), merge fully with the partner, or not notify the agreement, so
as to make it less likely that the Commission will require changes to be
made. This step is dangerous, although it is unlikely that a fine would
be imposed. If the parties fall out, there will be no chance of an exemp-
tion for the past. Once the parties have fallen out, it is likely that there
will be no exemption for the future either, even if the agreement is
notified by one of them,'" ° since the other will be able to raise difficul-
ties about the implementation of the agreement.
Under U.S. law, advice would be given that the agreement is sub-
ject to the rule of reason, and probably legal."' The agreement would
be carefully scrutinized since the market is very concentrated, but it
109 See, eg., The conditions imposed for exempting the joint venture of de Laval/Stork, 20
O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 215) 11 (1977), [1977] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. D69, where each party will
have to license the other to use its technology when the joint venture comes to an end, although 85
percent of the basic designs had been contributed by de Laval. Consequently, the parties can
neither rely on industrial property right nor on contractual provisions about the use of the technol-
ogy when an agreement is terminated, nor can they foresee their relative bargaining power at that
time.
110 In the Distillers case, [1980] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2229, para. 23 [1980] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R.
121, the Court assumed that late notification on the proper form would be effective.
111 See UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION, ANTITRUST GUIDE
FOR RESEARCH JOINT VENTURES, Case B, 32 (1980).
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would probably not be attacked by the Department of Justice. Europe-
an firms, however, may be subjected to far greater risk. If such agree-
ments are to be made, it is vital that each party should be able to rely
on the ancillary restraints being enforceable from the time that invest-
ment is committed, or the technology imparted. Further problems arise
if it is not known how valuable the electronic widget may be if devel-
oped, or the amount of work needed: what price should be paid to the
electronic company for undertaking the research and development?
Often this decision is avoided by providing that each party shall peri-
odically pay half the costs, and that the widget maker will take half the
electronic widgets it requires worldwide from the electronic company;
the latter will sell only to or to the order of the widget maker. This
does prevent the electronic firm selling to other widget makers, but why
should the widget partner provide technology for the use of his compet-
itors? No competition is being restricted other than that made possible
by the agreement. The present EEC position is difficult, but it is hoped
that national courts will follow the Community Court rather than the
Commission's practice and apply a rule of reason to such ancillary
restraints.
Despite the Commission's normal practice of looking to any re-
straint on conduct under Article 85(1) and assessing its effects on com-
petition only under 85(3), the Commission has occasionally cleared an
agreement" 2 or indicated that a class of agreement is not caught de-
spite important restrictions on conduct. In its notice on subcontracting
112 In Cane Sugar, 23 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 39) 64 (1980), [1980] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 559,
an agreement was cleared although most of the quota cane sugar which came into the Common
Market free of duty was foreclosed. It is thought that this was because the Commission had no
power to exempt it. There were no benefits to consumers to qualify the agreement for'exemption
under Article 85(3), nor to Community farmers to qualify it under Article 39; but only benefits to
the Lome producers whom the Commission wanted to protect. The Commission therefore,
granted negative clearance. In Distillers Victuallers, 23 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 233) 43 (1980),
[1980] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 244, the Commission granted a clearance to a post-sale restriction that
the whisky would be sold only to duty free outlets, on the absurd ground that the victuallers were
not equipped to deal with other outlets. Of course, they were not as they had been prohibited
from doing so. The Commission did not allege that a division of the market was necessary to
ensure that duty would be collected. It may be, however, that the victuallers would not have
gotten the whisky on such favorable terms had they been able to sell in other markets. We are not
told the relative terms given to the victuallers and other traders. This sounds like the clearance of
a restriction necessary to support price differentials, although the Commission does not indicate
that there were any; nor does the Commission indicate whether the other traders had additional
promotional expenses on which the victuallers would otherwise have been able to take a free ride.
See also Compari, 21 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 70) 69 (1978), [1978] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 397.
Compare with Holley, EEC AntitrustDevelopments, PRIVATE INVESTORS ABROAD-PROBLEMS
AND SOLUTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 37, 59 et seq. (1979).
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agreement,' 13 the Commission stated its view that, subject to certain
provisos, ancillary restrictions needed to preserve the secrecy of know-
how and the value of technology might be imposed on a subcontractor.
Without this possibility, such contracts might be replaced by carrying
on the total contract within the firm, and this would be even more an-
ticompetitive in effect. A firm would not impart know-how, etc. to
another firm to carry out a project for it, unless it could protect its tech-
nology from plagiarism by its competitors.
There are two lines of argument enabling a national court to en-
force an ancillary restraint: exemption and rule of reason analysis. So
far as it is known to the writer, the first has not been tested. It might be
argued that since Article 85 has direct effects on national law,114 and
that an argument is void under Article 85(2) only if it infringes Article
85(1) and does not merit exemption," 5 Article 9(1) of Regulation 17,
which confers exclusive power on the Commission to exempt, must be
invalid as contrary to the Treaty. If so, then Article 9(1) may be disre-
garded by national courts. This argument has gained strength from the
inability of the Commission to grant many exemptions. The Court,
however, has frequently referred to the inability of a national court to
grant an exemption without casting any doubt on the validity of Article
9(1).116
The more likely, though less radical road, would be for a national
court to accept the rulings of the Court rather than the practice of the
Commission, and in relation to ancillary restraints not of the kind listed
in Article 85(1) nor restraining or discouraging exports, apply a rule of
reason. Where the agreement merely divides the market or the fruits of
the developments which it makes possible, no likely competition would
be restricted. There is greater difficulty where the project restricts some
competition, while increasing other competitive elements. For exam-
ple, joint venture between firms,I" each of which might have entered
the market alone, and with complimentary facilities or technology, may
add the joint venture to the market earlier than either could have done
by itself, but reduce the likelihood of one parent doing so alone, with
113 22 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. C 1) 2 (1979), [1979] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 264.
114 See Regulation 17/62, note 2 supra.
115 This was held in Bosch, [1962] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 54, [1962] Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 30,
and as recently as De BIoos v. Bouyer, [1977] E. Comm. Ct. . Rep. at 2371, [1978] 1 Comm. Mkt.
L.R. at 530.
116 For instance, in .Bilger v. Jehle, Portelange, De Bloos and L'Oreal, Mr. John Usher of
Edinburgh University first suggested to me in conversation that it was strange that the Community
Court had never doubted the validity of Article 9(1).
117 Whether through ajointly owned subsidiary, ajoint committee, cross licenses or otherwise.
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the fear of the other doing so later.'
18
CONCLUSION
The provision in Article 85(2) that agreements that infringe Article
85 should be void, at least to the extent of the infringement, has created
considerable difficulties. The theories of competition and welfare de-
veloped by the classical economists and most of their successors are
based on the assumption of private property and contractual rights. It
will pay businessmen to make contracts and investments in reliance on
them only to the extent that they expect them to be performed or en-
forceable. Where the contractual collaboration is undesirable, the
sanction of nullity may be of some use and can do little harm." 9 But
apart from the area to which a per se rule applies in the United
States, 20 restraints that are ancillary to pro-competitive collaborations
should generally be enforceable.
The Community Court and Commission have not developed the
same theory ofper se offences so brilliantly developed in the early cases
under the Sherman Act. Naked restraints on pricing, market sharing,
and some kinds of collective boycott-included in the list contained in
Article 85(1) of agreements likely to restrict competition-are likely to
be condemned with fairly short reasoning if they are found capable of
restricting trade between Member States, but more market analysis is
required in the case of ancillary restraints. 12' In Consten & Grundig,
the Court seems to have developed aper se rule against absolute terri-
torial protection conferred by export bans or deterrents and devices
with a similar object or effect, and this has been consistently applied by
the Commission,1 22 despite mounting criticism. For all other restraints,
however, the Court seems to be applying a rule of reason, requiring an
analysis of the actual or intended effects in the light of market
conditions.
The Commission, however, habitually analyzes agreements under
Article 85(1) in the formalistic way developed by the German case law
118 See the analysis of the Supreme Court in United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co., 378
U.S. 158 (1964), criticized by E. GELLHORN, ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS IN A NUTSHELL,
343 (1981).
119 It may not be easy to tell whether the collaboration is undesirable, and so increase uncer-
tainty in marginal cases.
120 The Court and Commission would add export bans and deterrents.
121 See Groupement des Frabricants de Papiers Peints de Belgique v. Commission, [1975] E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1491, [1976] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 589.
122 The only exception is in relation to exclusive patent licenses, where the possibility of a
group exemption for export bans to protect small producers is envisaged in the draft group exemp-
tion. See note 76 supra.
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under Article 1 of the German Kartel law, and condemns any restric-
tion on the conduct of the parties, or third parties, provided the restric-
tion has, or may be expected to have, appreciable effects on the market.
Only under Article 85(3) does the Commission usually try to balance
any pro- and anti-competitive effects.
If national courts adopt the Commission's practice, it is feared that
many desirable contracts which restrict only competition that could not
take place without such an agreement, or which restrict competition
less than they increase it, may not be made. The Commission grants
few exemptions, and apart from some 1100 odd old agreements that
have not yet been dealt with, agreements enjoy no provisional validity
even when notified. Important agreements are unlikely to be exempted
unless certain clauses are altered. These alterations may well help one
party more than the other, and the whole contract may have to be rene-
gotiated after the parties have been implementing it, when their relative
bargaining power may have been altered as a result of the collabora-
tion. This is a considerable disincentive to notification. Where an im-
portant agreement has not been notified, the parties may well have to
argue, after they had fallen out, before either a national court or the
Commission, as to whether it should be enforced under Article 85(1).
Until recently, the problem seldom arose, owing to the provisional
validity invented by the Court in the Bosch case. In 1973, however, it
became clear that the doctrine did not apply to new agreements, and it
has been further limited in the Perfume cases.
There is fear that European firms that may have to compete in
world markets may fall behind technologically or have to merge com-
pletely, so as to reduce the risk of collaboration. Market analyses are
difficult, especially for lawyers and bureaucrats. But if such analyses
are not made, agreements that may have overall desirable conse-
quences should not be controlled. This means that national courts will
have to be strong in resisting claims that agreements are anti-competi-
tive just because some competitor is harmed.
Addendum
Since this article was written, the Maize Seed case, Nungesser v.
Commission, has been argued before the Community Court, and the
Advocate General, Madame Rozes, has delivered her opinion. The
German as well as the French and United Kingdom governments ar-
gued that it should not be assumed that an exclusive licence of plant
breeders' rights limited to one Member State infringes Article 85(1).
Madame Rozes stated that the Commission had condemned the agree-
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ment of 1961 under which Kurt Eisele had been able to obtain in Ger-
many plant breeders' rights to certain hybrid varieties of maize seed
developed by the French Institute, INRA, on the ground that this ena-
bled Eisele to restrain the sale in Germany of seeds of those varieties
produced in France. Consequently, Eisele's firm, Nungesser, enjoyed
absolute territorial protection. Madame Rozes considered that this
amounted to aper se prohibition of exclusive licences; the Commission
had confused the free movement of goods, protected by Articles 30-36
of the Treaty, with the competition rules. Exhaustion applies only to
the property right, to which the competition rules do not apply. In her
view, the territorial nature of exclusivity results from German law
rather than from the agreement of 1961.123
She added, at p. 86, that without the protection of exclusivity, Ei-
sele would have had no incentive to assume onerous obligations: to
pay royalties to INRA, and undertake the responsibilities required to
obtain and maintain plant breeders' rights under German law: select-
ing and growing the basic genetic material from which he, or selected
farmers, would grow certified hybrid seed under public supervision.
She pointed out that it would not be enough for him to have an exclu-
sive production licence unless he could restrain the sale of imported
seed.
[Since Kurt Eisele enjoyed in an indubitably legitimate manner the exclu-
sive right to sell the seed he himself produced,] he must necessarily, in
commercial terms enjoy the same exclusivity over the sale of seed of the
same varieties produced in France. Otherwise, he would have no interest
in maintaining his plant breeders' rights or assuming the costs which that
involved ... The absence of a right to restrain sales of imported seed
would carry the risk of negating his interest in the grant by law of the
exclusive right to reproduce INRA seeds and market them, which would
result in there being no production in Germany, as happened [in
Belgium].
124
123 Case 258/78, opinion delivered February 3, 1982. I have worked from the provisional
French text of her opinion and the views summarised come from pp.61-67. Although the authen-
tic text is German, the opinion must have been drafted in French by Madame Rozes, so it is
unlikely that there will be many changes.
She added that assignments and exclusive licences are very similar from an economic point of
view, in which case exclusive licences limited to a single Member State should not necessarily be
caught by Article 85(1) of the Treaty. Article 222 reserves to national law the regime of property
(p.79). When considering the clauses whereby the producers in France agreed not to sell directly
to Germany, save to Eisele's firm, she considered that the duty of good faith imposed by the
French law.of contract would prevent them from doing so anyway, so there was no agreement not
to do so to be caught by Article 85. When considering the restraint on indirect exports by custom-
ers of the producers, she noted that it was only Eisele's property right that could be used to re-
strain them.
124 Author's translation. She describes the position that developed in Belgium at p. 10. It is
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Madame Rozes went on to say that since, contrary to the Commission's
allegation in its decision, Nungesser had not been shown to have
charged prices more than 15 percent higher than those in France, the
exclusive right had not harmed competition. She added (p. 99) that she
did not understand the Commission's statement that it need not con-
sider whether the exclusive right to produce merited exemption, since
the exclusive right to sell, with the ancillary export bans, did not. She
pointed out that Eisele was not merely a distributor: he had assumed
the responsibility for maintaining the variety. He might cease to do so,
if the profitability of his sales was undermined by imports from France.
The Advocate General clearly stressed the need to protect those
carrying on certain useful activities from those who do not incur similar
costs or obligations taking a free ride on their investment. At times she
is clearly speaking about Article 85(1)125 and she stresses the Court's
ruling in Lancbme that an agreement does not infringe Article 85(1)
unless it has the prohibited object or effects. This depends less on the
legal nature of the agreement than on its actual effect. This opinion is
as strong as that of Mr. Warner in Distillers26 in looking not merely to
the conduct that is restricted, but rather to the difficult question of
whether the market is made less competitive by the agreement. The
author strongly hopes that the Court will not overrule her persuasive
opinion.
12 7
submitted that the argument would have been more cogent without the words the author placed
within square brackets.
125 Although at p.81 she is clearly speaking of an exemption when she says that an exclusive
licence limited territorially may fall within Article 85(3). At p.84 she states that this requires cost/
benefit analysis.
126 Distillers v. Commission [19801 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2229, [1980] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 121.
127 Thejuge rapporteur is Professor Koopmans. He is widely thought to be one of the most
able members of the Court. It is clear from the questions he asked at the oral hearing that he
understands the complex facts in issue, so it may be particularly difficult for his colleagues to limit
the cogency of the judgment.
